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Abstract 
The present article explores the effect of the salience of collective 
consequences of opportunistic behavior in commons and anticommons dilemmas. 
Making this type of externalities salient was expected to increase the awareness of the 
conflict between collective and personal interests, especially in the anticommons 
dilemma. The results of a vignette study (Study 1, N = 100) and a laboratory 
experiment (Study 2, N = 55) confirmed our hypotheses, revealing more opportunistic 
behavior in the anticommons than in the commons dilemma when externalities were 
not made salient, while no significant dilemma effect was obtained when the 
externalities were made salient. Moreover, the results of Study 2 demonstrated that 
the dilemma effect on cooperation was mediated by externalities awareness. The 
positive effects of increments in externalities awareness on cooperation are discussed.  
 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: anticommons, social dilemmas, commons, cooperation, decision 
making, awareness, externalities 
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 Since Hardin (1968) illustrated the risk of tragedies in common resource 
dilemmas, choice behavior in this type of social dilemma has elicited a growing 
research interest (e.g. Dawes, 1980; Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003; Komorita & Parks, 
1995; Ostrom, 1999; Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). The significance of this 
research enterprise is difficult to overestimate given the threatening real-life instances 
of such dilemmas, vividly exemplified by overfishing in oceans, the unconstrained 
use of oil reserves, and deforestation.  
During the last decade, the economic literature on commons dilemmas has 
elicited considerable debate. In particular, a number of theorists have asserted that its 
mirror image – the anticommons dilemma – may also have such negative effects (e.g. 
Heller, 1998; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). Under an anticommons property regime, all 
owners hold the right to exclude each other from using a common resource, but none 
of them can use the resource without the permission of all the co-owners. Some 
authors (e.g. Vanneste, Van Hiel, Parisi, & Depoorter, 2006) have reported that 
people ask significantly higher prices for a part of an anticommons property than the 
value they would take from an analogous commons property.  
Given the marked differences in choice behavior in commons and 
anticommons dilemmas, we need to understand why these behavioral differences 
emerge. In our opinion, these differences might be based on people’s awareness of the 
collective consequences of their choice behavior, in the economic literature referred to 
as an important type of ‘externalities’ (e.g. Fennell, 2004; Mundell, 1968) assumed to 
be a major determinant of people’s choice behavior. In the present study, we therefore 
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investigate the impact of increasing the awareness of the collective consequences of 
choice behavior, further referred to with the general term of ‘externalities awareness’, 
on behavioral decision making in both commons and anticommons dilemmas.  
The Commons Dilemma 
Garrett Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the commons’ provided insights into 
topics as diverse as overpopulation, air pollution, and species extinction. Hardin’s 
(1968) analysis was based on the assumption that many real-life social dilemmas are 
analogous to the overgrazing problem herdsmen face when their herds of sheep use 
the same pasturage. Here, each herdsman has the opportunity to add more sheep to his 
herd, leading to a greater yield (e.g. more wool). This positive outcome accrues to the 
individual herdsman, whereas the negative consequences (e.g. overgrazing of the 
commons) will be shared by all. The most rational and beneficial thing for each 
herdsman personally to do is to increase his herd, but this in turn will evoke a 
pervasive social tragedy: the pasture will be destroyed and no one will benefit in the 
long term. Hence, all herdsmen would be better off if they decide to cooperate by 
maintaining the optimal number of sheep. 
In more formal terms, the theory holds that as the number of individuals who 
enjoy free access to a common resource grows larger relative to its capacity, the total 
harvest of anyone involved will approach unsustainable levels that risk its complete 
destruction. Hence, if a depletable resource is open to access by multiple owners who 
do not have the effective right to exclude each other from harvesting the common 
resource, incentives for overutilization emerge. In line with this theory, research on 
commons dilemmas has revealed that there is a real danger of a wretched ending for 
commons property. Indeed, it has been extensively shown that over time people 
harvest more from the resource than its reproduction value, thereby depleting the 
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resource (for an overview, see Weber et al., 2004). According to Hardin (1968, 1998), 
one of the structural solutions to this tragedy is to remove resources from the public 
domain and hand them over to private ownership. In the next section, we discuss this 
possible solution. 
The Anticommons Dilemma 
Can privatization of common resources solve the problem of overutilization of 
these resources? Some studies have shown that when a resource is owned privately it 
is depleted less rapidly than when it is shared as public property among members of a 
group (Cass & Edney, 1978; Martichuski & Bell, 1991; Smith, 1981). This finding 
seems to offer convincing pro-arguments for the positive effect of privatizing publicly 
owned goods. Conversely, van Dijk and Wilke (1997) have shown that the 
presentation of a commons as a partitioned property does not yield these positive 
effects, and may even intensify the harvesting problems. Moreover, recent writings on 
the anticommons dilemma showed that privatization may lead to detrimental side 
effects (Heller, 1998). For example, Heller and Eisenberg (1998) have described the 
consequences of anticommons property rules for the development of biomedical 
research.  
Specifically, they discussed the example of a research team that wants to 
develop a new important medicine for the treatment of the human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV). The team needs to have patents from different firms to develop the 
medication. Because different firms own the patents, every single patent holder is 
eventually in a position to exclude a downstream user from developing the new 
medicine. Moreover, since none of the owners knows initially which patent will be 
the key for the new medicine, every patent holder tends to demand more money for 
his/her invention than its actual value. In the end, because the collective demanding 
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price is more than the cumulative market value of the end product, the research team 
has to forsake further development of the HIV medicine. Another net result emerging 
here is that all patent holders lose money because their patents are unused, even 
though the use of these patents is in great demand. Further examples of anticommons 
tragedies are the market for human tissue (Mahoney, 2000), underuse of Internet 
resources (Hunter, 2003), and copyright protection (Depoorter & Parisi, 2002).  
In more formal terms, the theory holds that when multiple owners all possess 
the right to exclude each other from benefiting from a scarce resource, the resource 
might tend to be underused. The tragedy of the anticommons occurs when co-owners 
exert their exclusion rights by withholding resources excessively from other users. As 
a result, the full value of the resource is not realized.  
Property Structure and Rights in Commons and Anticommons Dilemmas 
 Recent literature in economics and property law (Buchanan & Yoon, 2000; 
Fennell, 2004; Parisi, Schulz, & Depoorter, 2005) highlights the symmetrical property 
structure of commons and anticommons. According to the traditional concept of 
property, owners enjoy a complementary bundle of rights over their property, 
including the right to use the property and the right to exclude others from it. As can 
be seen in Figure 1 (adapted from Vanneste et al., 2006), commons and anticommons 
conditions can be conceived as symmetric deviations from the standard bundle of 
rights, whereby the rights of use and exclusion are kept in balance. Thus, in commons 
situations, the right to use the property stretches beyond the effective right (or power) 
to exclude others. Conversely, in an anticommons property regime, the co-owners’ 
right of use is crowded out by a dominant right of exclusion held by other co-owners. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
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 On a theoretical plane, using formal models, Buchanan and Yoon (2000) 
demonstrated that commons and anticommons problems result in equal welfare losses 
(see also Fennell, 2004; Parisi et al., 2005). However, unlike these formal algebraic 
models, Vanneste et al. (2006) showed in two empirical studies that underuse in 
anticommons properties may reflect a greater problem than overuse in equivalent 
commons properties. Specifically, in their study, participants in the commons 
condition were asked to take whatever they wished from a common resource (see also 
van Dijk & Wilke, 2000), while in the anticommons condition, participants 
established a value that they wished to receive for their part of the common property. 
The findings of Vanneste et al. (2006) showed that the anticommons condition 
yielded significantly higher asking prices than the amount of money taken in the 
commons condition.  
 If the commons and anticommons dilemmas constitute symmetric departures 
from the standard situation of full ownership in terms of structural properties, why 
then do people ask higher prices in an anticommons dilemma than the monetary 
amount they would take in an equivalent commons dilemma?  
Externalities Awareness 
 A variable at the center of the present article is the awareness of the collective 
consequences of defective behavior. These costs are not directly accruing to the actor 
who made the decision, but are rather received or paid by the collective or imposed on 
the resource. We refer to these external costs by the general term ‘externalities’ 
(Mundell, 1968). According to this perspective, when actors fail to internalize the 
consequences for everyone involved (the whole collective of co-owners), cooperation 
will not occur (e.g., Fennell, 2004; Parisi, et al., 2005; Schulz, Parisi, & Depoorter, 
2002). Conversely, if the owners internalize the externalities, rational decision makers 
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will choose to cooperate, thereby increasing the likelihood that all parties benefit and 
that the full value of the common property can be realized.  
 Previous studies seem to suggest that externalities awareness may yield the 
assumed positive effect. In particular, some studies have revealed that informing 
owners about the long-term negative effects of defective actions and the benefits of 
cooperation leads these owners to exhibit higher levels of actual cooperation and 
resource management efficiency (e.g., Foddy & Veronese, 1996; Rapoport, 1988; 
Schroeder, Jensen, Reed, Sullivan, & Schwab, 1983; Stern, 1976; Thompson & 
Stoutemeyer, 1991). Moreover, unveiling the externalities of a dilemma does not only 
affect the perception of this dilemma, but also may have implications at the moral 
level. In particular, Schwartz (1970) argued that people only behave cooperatively 
when the consequences of their actions for others are salient to them (see also 
Schwartz, 1977; Schwarz & Howard, 1982; van Dijk & Wilke, 1997). Hence, only 
when the negative consequences of non-cooperative behavior for others are clear, 
people are in a position to feel social responsible for their decisions, and thus are 
morally convinced that cooperation is the right thing to pursue.  
 Cooperation is thus facilitated by turning people’s attention to the collective 
consequences of their behavior. We argue that externalities awareness will matter in 
explaining the behavioral differences between the commons and anticommons 
dilemma because the implications of defective behavior in the commons dilemma are 
less ambiguous than those of the anticommons dilemma (see, Schulz, et al., 2002; 
Vanneste et al., 2006). In other words, the externalities in the commons dilemma are 
more salient compared to the externalities in the anticommons dilemma. According to 
Vanneste et al. (2006): “...most people readily comprehend that unrestrained use of 
common resources leads to total depletion of resources in the long run, and that those 
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who take more than their share out of the commons preclude others from partaking of 
its benefits” (p. 117). Indeed, under commons property rules, the collective property 
and its productive capacity can be clearly perceived at the very moment people decide 
whether they will cooperate or defect. As such, the consequences of the chosen 
actions are apparent as well. Thus, co-owners of a commons property can be expected 
to have some awareness of the fact that taking too much is bad for the collective 
interests. In economic terms, then, it is suggested that co-owners of a commons 
property are relatively apt to internalize the costs of non-cooperation in a commons 
dilemma.  
 Conversely, the social dilemma character of an anticommons property may be 
less salient, increasing the difficulty of detecting collective consequences. Indeed, 
people have to make decisions about the value of collective property that has not yet 
been created (e.g., new medication based on multiple privately owned patents) or is 
not currently productive (e.g., fragmented land that is currently unused). As such, 
because the collective benefits of property still have to be realized, and the negative 
consequences resulting from doing nothing are not instantly present (e.g., not using 
the patents), externalities awareness may be difficult to achieve. According to 
Kopelman (2009), this basic ambiguity of anticommons dilemmas makes people more 
likely to be influenced by cognitive biases, leading them only to pay heed to their 
personal benefits. In particular, people are likely to attribute higher values to their 
individual part of the property and may systematically undervalue the assets of the 
others. In economic terms, Schulz et al. (2002) argued that anticommons dilemmas 
make people prone to ‘forget’ “... that the exercise of a right of exclusion ... reduces or 
eliminates the value of similar rights held by other individuals” (p. 595). Moreover, 
people may be less attentive to the fact that “... the underuse of productive inputs 
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today bears [negative] consequences into the future...” (p. 595). In sum, co-owners of 
an anticommons property are relatively blind to the costs of non-cooperation in an 
anticommons dilemma, thereby failing to internalize these costs.  
The Present Research 
To summarize, we argue that the externalities are less salient in anticommons 
than in commons dilemmas. As such, the differential externalities salience makes 
people more or less aware of the externalities, leading them, in turn, to behave more 
versus less cooperatively, respectively. Given that making the externalities salient 
makes people more aware of them, people are expected to act more cooperatively 
when externalities salience is high, especially in the anticommons dilemma, thereby 
reducing the behavioral differences between commons and anticommons dilemmas.  
Based on our review of the literature, three main hypotheses have been 
formulated: 
Hypothesis 1. When externalities are salient, people exhibit relatively higher 
levels of cooperative choice behavior than when externalities are not salient. 
Hypothesis 1 thus states a main effect of externalities salience.  
Hypothesis 2. When externalities are not salient, anticommons dilemmas elicit 
higher levels of non-cooperative choice behavior than commons dilemmas. In 
contrast, under conditions that make the externalities salient, the differences between 
commons and anticommons conditions are curbed. Because making the externalities 
salient has the most pronounced effects on choice behavior in anticommons 
dilemmas, Hypothesis 2 states an interaction effect between dilemma type and 
externalities salience.  
 Hypothesis 3. The higher levels of non-cooperation in anticommons compared 
to commons dilemmas under low externalities salience can be explained by the lower 
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level of externalities awareness. Hypothesis 3 thus states that when externalities are 
not made salient, awareness of the externalities mediates the main effect of dilemma 
type on cooperation. 
Two studies were conducted to test the present hypotheses. In the externalities 
salient conditions, we made participants aware of the externalities by stressing the 
negative consequences of non-cooperative choice behavior for the other owners as 
well as for the common property. In the externalities not salient conditions, no such 
information was given. The strategy of manipulating information availability has the 
advantage that the dilemma structure remains completely analogous across the 
externalities salience conditions. 
In Study 1, we presented participants a hypothetical scenario in which a 
commons or anticommons dilemma situation was presented and the externalities were 
(not) made salient. In Study 2, we conducted an experimental lab study in which 
participants played a commons or anticommons dilemma game. Initially, participants 
made their choices without receiving information about the externalities (externalities 
not salient) and were probed into their externalities awareness. Subsequently, the 
externalities were made salient and they played a second round. 
STUDY 1: VIGNETTE STUDY 
Method 
Participants and Design 
The participants were 100 volunteering undergraduate psychology students at 
Ghent University (Mage = 19.39, SDage  = 1.60; 55% female). The study had a 2 x 2 
factorial design with dilemma type (commons versus anticommons) and externalities 
salience (salient versus not salient) as between-subject variables. 
Procedure and Material  
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The study was part of a classroom exercise and participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the four conditions, which were presented in an experimental 
vignette. The commons and anticommons dilemma tasks were based on the oil 
company scenario used by Van Hiel, Vanneste, and De Cremer (2008) and Vanneste 
et al. (2006, Study 2) and adapted to the four conditions. Participants read a scenario 
and subsequently made a bid on a pay-off scheme. Afterwards, they completed the 
manipulation check.  
Across all conditions, the basic dilemma structure and situation were 
completely analogous. Participants were presented with the following situation: “You 
are a co-owner of an oil well which is exhaustible. Besides your own company, there 
are four other co-owning companies. Your main objective is to gain as much money 
as possible. Of course, the other companies have the same objective.” 
Participants further read a text dependent upon the experimental condition. In 
the commons condition, it was asserted “Each year you have to make a bid regarding 
how much oil you want to take from the well.” The text ended with the question how 
much oil (expressed in euro) the participant is taking, not knowing how many the 
other owners will take. Participants made a bid and marked their choice on a pay-off 
scheme (see Table 1) ranging from €0 to €60000.  
In the anticommons condition, it was asserted: “At this moment co-owner B 
wants to drill a part of the oil well, but the four other companies (including yours) 
have to grant him/her permission for this. You should know that the amount of oil that 
will be gained by B cannot be drilled by you at a later stage.” The text ended with the 
question how much money the participant wants to ask for his/her part of the source, 
not knowing how much the other owners will ask. Participants made a bid and marked 
their choice on a pay-off scheme (see Table 1) ranging from €0 to €60000. 
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Besides the dilemma type, we also manipulated a second variable: the salience 
of the externalities. In the externalities not salient conditions, no extra information 
was given about the possible danger of over or underuse in the commons and 
anticommons conditions respectively and only the first two columns of the pay-off 
scheme were presented.  
In the externalities salient condition, additional information about the 
consequences of non-cooperative and cooperative choice behavior was explained 
before participants had to indicate their bid on the pay-off scheme. The danger of 
overuse in the commons condition and underuse in the anticommons condition was 
clearly emphasized.  
Thus, in the commons condition, with the externalities salient it was asserted: 
“if you take the maximum amount, there is a real danger that the other companies can 
drill less oil. Therefore, it may be in the companies’ collective interests that everyone 
drills less oil. Obviously, it may be to each company’s individual advantage to take as 
much as possible.” Furthermore, it was stressed that if the owner drills oil, he/she 
makes use of the source as well as the materials to drill the oil. Hence, the source will 
be liable to wear and decline and as a result the value of the source will decrease. The 
text ended with “The more oil you take, the more likely that the source value will 
decrease.” Besides this extra information, the information in the pay-off scheme was 
also extended to all columns of Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
In the anticommons condition, with the externalities salient it was asserted: “If 
you and the three other companies ask for the maximum amount, then there is a real 
danger that B will not buy a part of the well leaving the other companies (A, C, D, 
and E) ‘out in the cold’. Thus, it may be to the companies’ collective advantage to ask 
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less money. Obviously, it may be to each company’s individual advantage to ask as 
much as possible.” Furthermore, it was stressed that if owner B can drill oil, he/she 
will maintain the source and the drill materials so that the source value will be 
preserved. The text ended with “The higher the price you ask, the less likely owner B 
is to buy and thus maintain the source, the more likely that the source value will 
decrease.” Analogous with the commons condition, the information in the pay-off 
scheme was extended to all columns of Table 1.  
Participants finally completed an item that checked whether participants in the 
externalities salient condition appropriately read and understood the additional 
information, compared to participants in the externalities not salient condition. The 
item asked whether participants “were aware that if all owners take/ask a substantial 
amount of money, it would be likely that the value of the source would decrease. 
Thus, taking/asking a lot of money is bad for the collective interests”. This item had 
to be rated on a 6-point scale ranging from totally unaware (1) to totally aware (6). 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
 First, we subjected the item score on the manipulation check to a 2 (dilemma 
type: commons versus anticommons) x 2 (externalities not salient versus externalities 
salient) univariate ANOVA. The results only showed a main effect of externalities 
salience, F(1, 96) = 88.15, p < .001, η2 = .48, revealing that our manipulation was 
successful. Participants in the externalities salient condition (M = 5.02) reported being 
more aware of the externalities than the participants in the externalities not salient 
condition (M = 2.72). 
 Choice Behavior 
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We subjected the choice behavior data to a 2 (dilemma type: commons versus 
anticommons) x 2 (externalities not salient versus externalities salient) univariate 
ANOVA. Figure 2 presents the mean amounts of money and standard deviations for 
each condition. 
In line with Hypothesis 1, we obtained a significant main effect of externalities 
salience, F(1, 96) = 66.13, p < .001, η2 = .41. Furthermore, replicating Vanneste et al. 
(2006), a main effect of dilemma type was obtained as well, F(1, 96) = 21.36, p < 
.001, η2 = .18. Importantly, in line with Hypothesis 2, a significant interaction 
emerged, F(1, 96) = 4.06, p < .05, η2 = .04 (see Figure 2). 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
To interpret this interaction effect, we conducted simple effects analyses. As 
predicted by Hypothesis 2, the dilemma effect was significant in the externalities not 
salient condition, F(1, 96) = 20.78, p < .001, η2 = .18, whereas this effect was much 
weaker in the externalities salient condition, and did not attain the conventional 
significance level (p < .05), F(1, 96) = 3.60, p = .06, η2 = .04. 
Discussion 
 In this first study, we manipulated externalities salience as well as dilemma 
type. In line with Hypothesis 1, it was shown that when the externalities were made 
salient, people harvested significantly less than when the externalities were not made 
salient. This finding demonstrates the impact of manipulating the salience of the 
externalities. Furthermore, in line with Hypothesis 2, a significant interaction effect 
between dilemma type and externalities salience emerged, revealing a rather large 
dilemma effect in the externalities not salient condition, whereas this effect was only 
marginally present in the externalities salient condition.  
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However, although the results of Study 1 supported Hypotheses 1 and 2, the 
study might be faulted for its scenario methodology examining hypothetical decisions 
rather than actual behavior. Hence, in Study 2 we aimed to extend the findings of 
Study 1 by investigating actual decision behavior in an experimental lab study. 
 
STUDY 2: LAB EXPERIMENT 
In this lab study, participants played an experimental game in which they 
made their choices once without (externalities not salient) and once with receiving 
information about the externalities (externalities salient). In addition, Study 2 also 
directly addressed the question whether externalities awareness accounts for the 
differences in choice behavior between commons and anticommons dilemmas. This 
mediation effect was studied in the first phase of the experiment, when the 
externalities had not been made salient yet. More specifically, as outlined in 
Hypothesis 3, under low externalities salience, awareness of the externalities was 
expected to mediate the effect of dilemma type on choice behavior. Hence, we also 
measured participant’s externalities awareness in order to test its mediating role.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 55 undergraduate students (Mage = 21.30, SDage = 2.27; 77 % 
female) were paid for voluntary participation in this experiment. The present study 
had a 2 x 2 design with externalities salience (externalities salient versus not salient) 
manipulated as a within-subject variable and dilemma type (commons versus 
anticommons) as a between-subject variable. Participants were randomly assigned to 
the dilemma condition.  
Procedure 
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 Five participants were scheduled for each session. Upon arrival at the 
laboratory, participants were seated in separate cubicles in front of a computer and 
were led to believe that their computers were interconnected. All further instructions, 
stimulus materials, and questionnaires were presented on computer screen using the 
Tscope C/C++ programming library (Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & 
Vandierendock, 2006).  
Participants were instructed to play a collective game. Dependent on the 
dilemma condition they read the initial task instructions pertaining to a commons or 
an anticommons dilemma without information about the externalities. Subsequently, 
they played a first round in which they made a bid and completed a measure that 
probed into their awareness of the externalities. Next, they were given information 
about the externalities, after which they played a second round, completing the same 
measures as in the first round. Participants were not forewarned that the game would 
end after these two rounds.  
Dilemma Game. Across all conditions, the basic dilemma structure and 
situation were completely analogous, and the dilemma was based on the oil company 
scenario used in Study 1. It was told to the participants that they were co-owner of a 
communal oil well containing an exhaustible amount of oil barrels (12000 barrels, 
worth €480000)  
 In the commons condition, participants had to choose how much oil they want 
to take from the well. Each round, participants could earn money by taking oil out of 
the oil well for an amount ranging between €0 and €140000, being uninformed about 
the other player’s intentions. No further information about the other players or about 
specific resource characteristics was given. 
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In the anticommons condition, it was asserted that if one of the participants 
wants to use the oil well, he or she has to financially compensate the other four 
players. Hence, each round, participants in the anticommons condition indicated the 
amount of money ranging between €0 and €140000 they wanted to receive for their 
part of the property, being uninformed about the other player’s intentions. As in the 
commons condition, no further information about the other players or about specific 
resource characteristics was given. 
After reading the information, participants received some comprehension 
questions probing their understanding of the game. If one or more incorrect answers 
were given, the information and the questions were presented again. Next, participants 
were asked to choose the amount of money they wanted to receive, followed by the 
message to wait until all participants have made their bids. After a short time lag 
participants were asked to complete the measure of awareness of the externalities. 
Next, before playing the second round participants were informed that the 
value of the oil well was decreased as a result of the first round. Participants in the 
commons condition were further explained that the total amount asked by all owners 
in Round 1 is taken away from the oil well, decreasing its value. In the anticommons 
dilemma it was explained that no one bought oil because the total price demanded by 
all participants was higher than the amount participants were willing to pay. 
Therefore, the oil-well was not appropriately maintained, decreasing its value. In 
order to keep the feedback consistent across participants and across dilemma type, no 
specific information was given about the choices of the other co-owners and about the 
exact decrease in value of the oil-well. After receiving this general feedback, 
information about the externalities was presented.  
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In the commons condition, it was asserted that: “if you take the maximum 
amount of money, there is a real danger that the other participants can drill less oil. As 
a result, no-one will be able to fully profit of the well. Thus, in terms of collective 
interests, it is better that everyone takes less money. Obviously, it is  in each 
participant’s individual advantage to take as much as possible.” Furthermore, it was 
explained that if each participant restricts him/herself to take oil for a maximal 
amount of money of €15000, the oil well regenerates itself and keeps its value for a 
100%. It was also stressed that the more the owners drill oil, the more they make use 
of the source as well as the materials to drill the oil. Hence, the source would be liable 
to wear and decline and as a result the value of the source would decrease. It was 
finally stated: “The more oil you take, the more likely that the source value will 
decrease.”  
In the anticommons condition, it was asserted that: “If you and the other 
participants ask the maximum amount of money there is a real danger that all buyers 
will decline trying to acquire the well. As a result, no-one will be able to fully profit 
of the well. Thus, in terms of collective interests, it is better that everyone asks less 
money. Obviously, it is in each participant’s individual advantage to ask as much as 
possible.” Furthermore, it was explained that if each participant restricts him/herself 
to ask prices for a maximal amount of €15000, there would be 100% certainty that the 
sale would go on. It was also stressed that if nobody would use the oil well, the source 
and the drill materials would not be maintained. Hence, the source would be liable to 
wear and decline and as a result the value of the source would decrease. It was finally 
stated: “The higher the price you ask, the more likely that the source value will 
decrease.” 
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In both the commons and anticommons condition the text ended with two 
examples explaining what would happen when each participant asks more than 
€15000, as well as the consequences of each participant asking €15000 or less. After 
correctly answering a comprehension question, participants indicated their bids and 
completed the measure of awareness of externalities again. 
Awareness of Externalities The measure of awareness of the externalities 
consisted of four items which had to be rated on a 9-point scale ranging from totally  
unaware (1) to totally aware (9). Sample items are: “Were you aware of the fact that if 
all participants would ask a small amount of money, it would be more likely that 
everyone benefit?” and “When choosing an amount of money, did you consider that if 
all participants would ask a substantial amount of money, it is very likely that de 
value of the source decreases, which is bad for collective interests?” This measure 
proved to be internally consistent (α = .91 and α = .81, for the first and second round, 
respectively). 
Results 
Choice Behavior Data 
Data of three participants were excluded because of computer problems or 
because of failure to follow the instructions appropriately. In order to test Hypotheses 
1 and 2, we subjected the choice behavior data (see, Figure 3a) to a repeated measures 
ANOVA with externalities salience as a within-subject variable and dilemma type as 
a between-subject variable. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, a significant main effect was obtained for 
externalities salience, F(1, 50) = 60.43, p < .001, η2 = .56. The effect of dilemma type 
was also significant, F(1, 50) = 5.48, p < .05, η2 = .10. In corroboration with 
Hypothesis 2, we obtained a significant dilemma type x externalities salience 
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interaction, F(1, 50) = 5.23, p < .05, η2 = .10, showing that participants in the 
anticommons condition asked significantly higher amounts of money than participants 
in the commons condition when the externalities were not salient, F(1, 50) = 5.48, p < 
.05, η2 = .10, while the dilemma effect was curbed (and even non-significant) when 
the externalities were made salient, F(1, 50) = .69, p = .41, η2 = .01.  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Externalities Awareness 
As can be seen in Figure 3b, similar to the results of the choice behavior data, 
we obtained significant main effects for externalities salience and dilemma type, F(1, 
50) = 76.64, p < .001, η2 = .61, and F(1, 50) = 8.87, p < .005, η2 = .15, respectively, as 
well as a significant dilemma type x externalities salience interaction, F(1, 50) = 
10.49, p < .005, η2 = .17, on externalities awareness. In line with our expectations, 
participants in the anticommons condition were less aware of the externalities 
compared to participants in the commons condition when the externalities were not 
salient, F(1, 50) = 12.24, p < .001, η2 = .20, while no such significant differences were 
found when the externalities were made salient, F(1, 50) = .18, p = .68, η2 = .004.  
Mediation Analyses 
Finally, we tested Hypothesis 3 stating that when the externalities are not 
made salient, externalities awareness mediates the dilemma effect on choice behavior. 
Hence, in the following analyses, only the choice behavior data of the first round 
(before the externalities were made salient) were included as a dependent variable. 
Following Baron and Kenny (1986), we conducted a series of regression analyses to 
test the mediation effect of externalities awareness. Four conditions need to be met. 
First, the independent variable has to significantly influence the dependent variable. 
The significant effect of dilemma type on choice behavior data, β = .31, p < .05, 
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fulfills this first requirement. Second, the effect of the independent variable on the 
mediating variable has to be significant, which was confirmed by the present data as 
dilemma type was strongly related to externalities awareness, β = -.44, p < .05. Third, 
when regressing the dependent variable on both the independent variable and the 
mediator, a significant effect of the mediator has to be shown. Fourth, the effect of the 
independent variable has to dissipate when accounting for the mediator. In line with 
the two latter requirements, a regression analysis simultaneously including dilemma 
type and externalities awareness as predictors of choice behavior revealed a 
significant effect of externalities awareness, β = -.35, p < .05, whereas the effect of 
dilemma type was reduced to non-significance, β = .16, p > .26. Additionally, a Sobel 
test confirmed that externalities awareness significantly mediated the effect of 
dilemma type on choice behavior, z = 2.00, p < .05. 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1, corroborating 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. In particular, we demonstrated that participants posted lower bids 
in the externalities salient condition than in the externalities not salient condition 
(Hypothesis 1), and that the dilemma effect was curbed when the externalities were 
made salient (Hypothesis 2). Furthermore, in line with Hypothesis 3, we also showed 
that the higher levels of non-cooperation in anticommons compared to commons 
dilemmas in the externalities not-salient condition can be ascribed to lower levels of 
externalities awareness. The reader may have noticed that, similar to Study 1, also 
Study 2 used an oil well as the common good. A question arising here is whether 
similar results would have been obtained with other types of common properties. 
However, given that Van Hiel et al. (2008) reported related findings using different 
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hypothetical situations, we are confident that the present findings would also emerge 
with other common goods.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present two studies focused on the effect of salience of externalities on 
cooperation in commons and anticommons dilemmas. Both studies yielded 
corroborative evidence for our hypotheses. Importantly, the evidence for our 
hypotheses was obtained using different methods (i.e. vignette study versus laboratory 
experiment) and different research designs (i.e. presentation of the externalities 
conditions in a between-subjects versus a within-subjects design). The employment of 
these different methodologies yielded consistent findings, which contribute to the 
validity of our findings.  
In line with Hypothesis 1, the present studies revealed that participants asked 
for significantly less money when the externalities were made salient than when the 
externalities remained ambiguous. The present positive effects of externalities 
salience align well with previous research findings on environmental uncertainty in 
resource dilemmas. More specifically, experimental studies have shown that 
compared to conditions in which the resource characteristics are clear (paralleling the 
externalities salient condition), unawareness of the specific resource characteristics 
like resource size and capacity to regenerate (paralleling the externalities not salient 
condition) often leads to an overestimation of these characteristics and to an overuse 
of the resource (Budescu, Rapoport, & Suleiman, 1990; de Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, 
Wit, De Cremer, & de Rooij, 2007; Gustafsson, Biel, & Gärling, 1999, 2000; Hine & 
Gifford, 1996; van Dijk, Wit, Wilke, & Budescu, 2004). In other words, these 
previous studies as well as the present studies clearly showed that when people have 
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received full information, possibly leading to higher levels of externalities awareness, 
they refrain from excessively harvesting the common resource.  
The main objective of the present study, however, was to show that 
anticommons dilemmas elicit more defective behavior than commons dilemmas 
(Vanneste et al., 2006), exactly because of low externalities awareness. In accordance 
with Hypothesis 2, we demonstrated that the difference in choice behavior elicited by 
these two dilemma types can be reduced to non-significance by increasing the 
externalities salience. Moreover, in accordance with Hypothesis 3, it was revealed that 
the underlying psychological mechanism accounting for the higher levels of selfish 
behavior in anticommons relative to commons dilemmas, resides in the lack of 
externalities awareness. 
In the following sections, we further go into depth into our findings pertaining 
to Hypotheses 2 and 3. In particular, we first elaborate upon the possible causes and 
implications of (the lack of) externalities awareness in the anticommons dilemma. 
Then, we discuss whether loss aversion may offer an alternative explanation for the 
present findings and we also elaborate on the co-occurrence of rational and moral 
considerations to cooperate. Finally, some limitations of the present studies and 
suggestions for future research are highlighted. 
The Hidden Costs of the Anticommons Dilemma  
Selfish behavior under a commons regime represents a major threat to society 
and humanity worldwide. At first glance, an efficient way of dealing with this 
problem of overuse is dividing the common good into private segments (e.g., Hardin, 
1968). Martichuski and Bell (1991), for instance, showed that when the common 
resource was divided into private segments so that individuals managed their own 
access to a private segment, they were more effective in maintaining the resource. 
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However, the theoretical work of Heller (1998; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998) highlighted 
the detrimental problems of underuse which may arise when privatization is 
structured as an anticommons property regime. In line with the work of Heller and 
colleagues, the present data as well as previous studies (Van Hiel et al., 2008; 
Vanneste et al., 2006) demonstrated that anticommons property regimes may elicit  
even more selfish choice behavior than an equivalent commons dilemma.  
The present results reveal that people who are involved in the commons 
dilemma seem to some extent aware of the negative consequences of non-cooperative 
behavior, while in the anticommons dilemma people only seem to be aware of the 
individual benefits of defecting. This finding concurs with Van Hiel et al. (2008) who 
reported that cooperative targets were attributed higher levels of ignorance (indicative 
of the attributer’s poor externalities awareness) than non-cooperative targets in an 
anticommons dilemma, whereas an opposite pattern of results was obtained for the 
commons dilemma. According to Van Hiel et al. (2008), these results are indicative of 
the presence of a strong self-centered rationality in the anticommons dilemma. The 
present results combined with Van Hiel et al. (2008), then, suggest that unveiling 
externalities of the anticommons dilemma (i.e., lowering ignorance) transforms the 
underlying rationality principle (see, Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986) from 
the individual level to the group level, making cooperation more likely to occur.  
A possible reason why the externalities are more salient in the commons than 
in the anticommons dilemma resides in the structural features of these dilemmas. The 
productive capacity of a property under commons property rules is already present at 
the moment when people have to decide whether they will cooperate or defect. In 
other words, the property is initially perceived at its full potential, and it is reasonably 
clear to the owners that taking much of its value may be harmful. In contrast, under 
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anticommons property rules, people deal with a non-productive property or property 
that has yet to be created at the moment they are required to make decisions about the 
value of that property (Kopelman, 2009). Hence, the positive effects of cooperation 
tend to be ‘hidden’ in the future, and people only become aware of losses in the long 
run.  
In sum, when an anticommons dilemma is at stake, it is thus important to 
unveil its ‘dilemma character’. For example, the considerable impact of the work of 
Heller (1998; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998) on law and economic literature can probably 
be attributed best to its surprising and innovative insights in the domain of patenting, 
which had previously gone unnoticed. Indeed, Heller and Eisenberg’s (1998) 
theoretical development of the anticommons dilemma and its application to the 
patenting system have clearly shown the hitherto hidden costs of patenting and caused 
increased attention and discussion about the usefulness of patents (e.g. Buckley, 2007; 
Epstein & Kuhlik, 2004; Scherer, 2002). The controversy on the patenting system 
presents us with a vivid example of the unexpected insights generated by the 
deconstruction of situations in terms of an anticommons dilemma, and the work of 
Heller and colleagues might be rightfully considered to raise externalities awareness 
about such situations.  
Ownership and Moral Suasion in Anticommons Dilemmas 
An alternative explanation for the higher prices under anticommons property 
rules should be mentioned. In particular, the claim of higher prices to give up (or, ‘to 
lose’) a part of the property under the  anticommons regime compared to the amounts 
co-owners ‘gain’ under a commons regime might be interpreted as an endowment 
effect (Thaler, 1980, van Dijk & van Knippenberg, 1996). Within this perspective, the 
owners in an anticommons regime would be asking higher prices as a strategy to 
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compensate for giving up an object, reflecting loss aversion. However, although this 
interpretation in terms of endowment is tempting, there are several fundamental 
differences between an anticommons dilemma and a classic dyadic bargaining 
situation. Unlike bargaining situations, a typical ingredient of the anticommons 
regime is the fragmentation of property resulting in a different and more complex 
interdependence structure of co-ownership. Indeed, in an anticommons dilemma, both 
the potential buyer and sellers might be co-owners of the property. Hence, given that 
it is already difficult to define choices as losses or gains in most social dilemma types, 
(Schwartz-Sea & Simmons, 1995), this might even prove more difficult in the 
anticommons dilemma. Furthermore, in many anticommons dilemmas, like for 
instance granting permission to use a patent in exchange for money, one does not lose 
ownership and the right to exclude others from the property, rendering an explanation 
in terms of endowment cumbersome.  
A second important issue arising here concerns the question by which 
considerations people become motivated to cooperate. Our manipulation of 
externalities awareness is focused on rational considerations, but it cannot be denied 
that this manipulation may have spill-over effects in the moral domain, in the sense 
that it may indicate ‘the right thing to do’. It should be stressed, however, that unlike 
studies on moral suasion (Martichuski & Bell, 1991; see also Orbell & Dawes, 1981), 
the present manipulation of externalities awareness did not explicitly formulate moral 
standards for conduct. Based on the present data, however, we cannot draw a sharp 
line between ‘cool cognition’ and ‘moral obligations’ because rational and moral 
considerations often co-occur. The reason for this match of rationality and morality 
resides in the basic nature of a social dilemma, that is, in the mere fact that long term 
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cooperation leads to a better conservation of the common good as well as to increased 
benefits for anyone involved.  
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
Before closing, we want to highlight several important issues that may lead to 
interesting future studies. First, the present studies focused on the effects of the 
salience of one general type of externalities, namely the collective consequences of 
opportunistic behavior. Further research is required to investigate the impact of the 
salience of other externalities types, such as negative external costs for third parties 
uninvolved in the decision making, as well as the impact of other well-known 
determinants of cooperation in social dilemmas, such as social uncertainty or social 
value orientation (see Weber et al., 2004). Indeed, once people are aware of the 
collective consequences of their behavior and correctly identify the dilemma character 
of the situation, these other determinants of cooperation are still likely to have effects.  
Another interesting issue is whether the underuse of a common resource under 
anticommons property regime may turn out to have beneficial effects for the group of 
co-owners. For instance, claiming high prices for an almost depleted resource may 
reduce the demand, thereby allowing the resource enough time to regenerate itself. 
Finally, it is plausible that the use of one- and two-shot dilemmas may have 
not given a full picture of the impact of externalities salience. Future research may 
apply a sequential game procedure to investigate the longitudinal course of 
participant’s choice behavior. Indeed, at this moment it remains unclear whether the 
decrease in opportunistic behavior caused by salient externalities will stagnate, 
continue, or conversely, disappear and turn back into selfish behavior, and how this 
decrease may be facilitated or inhibited by associating real monetary awards to 
participants’ decisions.  
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the present research contribute to our understanding of 
behavioral decision making in commons and anticommons dilemmas by addressing 
the question why people behave more opportunistically in an anticommons dilemma 
than in an equivalent commons dilemma. The present studies showed that making 
salient the externalities successfully evoked cooperative behavior, particularly in the 
anticommons dilemma. Hence, revealing the externalities is likely to be a promising 
way to deal with the problem of underuse in anticommons dilemmas, without making 
complex structural changes concerning the underlying property rights and rules.  
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Table 1. Pay-off scheme used in Study 1 
Choice Amount of 
money you 
take a 
(1) 
Probability on 
value 
preservation of 
the oil source 
(2) 
Probability that 
other companies 
can benefit 
Probability on 
value 
preservation 
AND that other 
companies can 
benefit 
◊ 
◊ 
◊ 
◊ 
◊ 
◊ 
◊ 
◊ 
◊ 
◊ 
◊ 
◊ 
◊ 
0 
5 000 
10 000 
15 000 
20 000 
25 000 
30 000 
35 000 
40 000 
45 000 
50 000 
55 000 
60 000 
100 % 
100% 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
100 % 
100% 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
Here you have to 
take (1) AND (2) 
into account.   
In other words 
you have to 
combine both 
columns.  
a In the anticommons condition this label was changed into “Money you ask from B 
as compensation”.  
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Use and exclusion in commons and anticommons dilemmas, adapted from 
Vanneste et al. (2006) 
 
Figure 2. Mean amounts of money (with SD’s between brackets) as a function of 
externalities salience and dilemma type in Study 1 
 
Figure 3. Mean amounts of money (Figure 3a) and awareness of the externalities 
(Figure 3b) (with SD’s between brackets) as a function of externalities salience and 
dilemma type in Study 2 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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